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n the early days of flight, airlines couldn’t provide air
service profitably so the government stepped in with
support. Airlines began to carry mail, paid for by
airmail contracts. By 1933, four carriers collected 94 percent
of airmail service subsidies. Later, the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) set fares, subsidies, and mail rates. Airlines
were permitted profits, based on reported operating ratios.
That provided an incentive for airlines to overinvest and
generate higher operating costs. Profitable routes also 
subsidized unprofitable ones, justified by the CAB, which
contended small cities would otherwise lose air service. By
1978, airlines were largely deregulated, but for decades gov-
ernment intervention was exploited to serve the interests
of various stakeholders — including the regulated firms.
This is an example of regulatory capture. 
Capture can take various forms: subsidies, control of
entry by competitors, and price-setting, among
others. Economist George Stigler, who did
much to develop the theory of regulatory 
capture and to identify prominent cases, 
concluded that “as a general rule, regulation is
acquired by the industry and is designed and
operated for its benefit.” Stigler’s work built on 
earlier research on political utility maximiza-
tion. He applied those theories to regulation,
and helped pave the way for the deregulation
wave that began in the late 1970s.
Regulation is typically a response to a per-
ceived market failure, ostensibly to serve the
public interest. But as the airline industry
example demonstrates, regulatory capture can
pose problems for policymakers who want 
to implement regulation that improves the
general welfare. Last spring, people questioned
the conduct of the government regulator over-
seeing offshore drilling. But it’s unclear, until the case is
unraveled, whether regulatory capture or simple ineptitude
contributed to the accident.
A significant insight emerging from capture theory is
that a regulator may act, either intentionally or unintention-
ally, in a way that results in personal or institutional gain.
This can be fostered through a close relationship between
industries and regulatory agencies. Regulating agencies may
have incentive to hire from regulated firms to acquire exper-
tise, and firms may rely on industry-supplied knowledge. 
An early federal regulatory effort was the Interstate
Commerce Act of 1887. Railroads supported the creation 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) because 
its rules would strengthen the existing cartel. Previously, 
railroads had competed for business through price wars,
secret rebates, and price concessions. The ICC is now
regarded as a classic example of regulatory capture, in which
regulators enact rules in favor of the regulated industry. For
example, in the Transportation Act of 1920, Congress
allowed the ICC to regulate minimum, not just maximum,
shipping rates. The Act also controlled entry into and exit
from the industry. Stigler also cited the regulation of long-
distance trucking as an example of capture. As roads and
vehicles improved, by 1930 trucks posed competition for
railroads in long-distance hauling. The railroads then sought
state-imposed weight limits on trucks. Soon all states regu-
lated truck weight and dimensions. Stigler noted that Texas
and Louisiana limited trucks serving (in competition with)
two or more railroad stations to 7,000 pounds. But trucks
that served (did not compete with) one station were allowed
twice the weight, 14,000 pounds. In 1935 the
Motor Carrier Act gave the ICC the power to
control permits, approve routes, and set tariffs.
That discouraged new entrants. Ultimately,
Congress deregulated the industry over indus-
try and union opposition, but it took a long
time, until 1980.
Regulatory capture also can become institu-
tionalized. For example, local and state citizen
boards may be comprised of those who work in
a profession or industry, creating a potential
conflict of interest. In some states practi-
tioners of law, medicine, dentistry, cosmetol-
ogy and others may draft laws that determine
the qualifications of those eligible to enter
their occupation.
The extent of regulatory capture depends to
some degree on the intensity of interest among
those affected. Regulated firms may have much
at stake in regulatory activity. Consumers, though, will have
a small or diffused stake in the outcome. Environmental 
regulation is a classic case where regulated firms have 
concentrated interests, but individual interest is diffuse.
Environmental organizations act as intermediaries, osten-
sibly promoting the public interest through lobbying and
other efforts.
An essential insight of Stigler and other economists who
followed his lead was that all players in the regulatory regime
— firms, bureaucrats, interest groups, and legislators — act
as economic agents who have the interest and opportunity
to advance strategic actions. Although public service may
motivate players, Stigler pointed out that these are not the
only incentives at work.  RF
JARGONALERT
Regulatory Capture
BY BETTY JOYCE NASH
I
L
L
U
S
T
R
A
T
I
O
N
:
 
T
I
M
O
T
H
Y
 
C
O
O
K